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Abstract: This article evaluates the level of integration of Members of the European Parliament from Central and Eastern Europe in 
the European Parliament after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The main objective is to address the puzzle of how 
the European Parliament’s political groups could maintain or even increase their voting cohesion after the influx of a 
significantly large number of new MEPs coming from countries with different historical experience, socio-economic 
characteristics, and political and party systems. Three indicators of MEP integration are defined: integration into 
parliamentary leadership, integration into parliamentary work, and integration into voting patterns. The article uses data from 
the VoteWatch.eu website on MEPs’ activities and voting between the years 2004-2011, as well as data from official 
documents of the European Parliament and its political groups. Analysis of the data reveals that the new member states’ 
MEPs were significantly under-represented in parliamentary leadership and key legislative activities, despite the fact that their 
voting loyalty to their political groups was greater than that of their colleagues from older member states.  
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Introduction 
In this article we reveal the way Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) integrated themselves in the Parliament’s work and decision-making 
structures and thus we provide an explanation of how the political groups of the European 
Parliament (EP) were able to maintain or even increase their voting cohesion after the eastern 
enlargement. The voting behaviour of MEPs has been the subject of research and analysis of 
various scholars over the last few years (for example Hix, A. G. Noury, and Roland 2007; 
Kreppel 2002; Raunio 1997; Ringe 2009). More specifically, Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007) 
examined roll-call votes from 1979 to 2004 and revealed that MEPs vote increasingly along 
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political group lines and decreasingly along national lines. The cohesion of political groups in the 
EP has been increasing and the political groups have become gradually more competitive, with 
left-right cleavages becoming more common than big voting coalitions across the political 
spectrum. The question is how this clear trend has been affected by enlargement.  
The eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have, among other changes in European Union 
institutions, introduced a significant number of new politicians representing citizens from Central 
and Eastern Europe to the European Parliament. The assembly has grown from 626 members 
before Enlargement to 785 members (732 after 2004), with the new representatives amounting to 
about one quarter of the new Parliament. Such an increase in the number of MEPs from new 
Member States, moreover from countries with structurally distinct political, socio-economic and, 
in particular, party systems was unprecedented3. It was thus expected that this would affect the 
inner workings of the European Parliament, its political groups and especially their voting 
cohesion. However, we know that legislative production in the European Parliament after 
enlargement has been faster compared with the previous parliament (e.g. Hagemann 2009) and 
that voting cohesion among the political groups has even slightly increased (Hix and A. Noury 
2009; data VoteWatch.EU).  
The absolute cohesion score introduced by Hix et al. (Hix, A. G. Noury, and Roland 
2007, chap. 5) shows the extent to which the members of a EP party group vote as a block. This 
so called Agreement Index equals 1 when all the members of a group vote together and equals 0 
when the members of a group are equally divided between all three voting options, i.e. Yes, No 
and Abstaining (for a precise formula see Hix, A. G. Noury, and Roland 2007, 91). The cohesion 
scores for the political groups in the 5th EP (1999-2004) and the 6th EP (2004-2009) were as 
follows: European Peoples Party-European Democrats 0.87 and 0.88, Party of European 
Socialists 0.90 and 0.91, Liberals – ALDE 0.88 and 0.89, Union for Europe of the Nations  0.75 
and 0.76, Greens/EFA 0.92 and 0.91, European United Left-NGL 0.80 and 0.85, 
Independence/Democracy 0.50 and 0.47, Non-attached 0.44 and 0.44 (Hix and A. Noury 2006, 
16, data for the 5th EP; “VoteWatch.eu European Parliament” n.d. 
http://www.votewatch.eu/cx_european_party_groups.php for data for the 6th EP).  
This finding is rather surprising, as the entrance of many new politicians was, to a certain 
extent, expected to complicate the existing structures. One hypothesis suggested that the influx 
                                                 
3 Since the EP has been directly elected, MEPs from newly accessed countries constituted 5,53 % (1981), 16,21 % 
(1986), and 9,42 % (1995) of all the MEPs. 
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of many new MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)4 would make the Parliament more 
heterogeneous and that, consequently, new political cleavages would develop in line with 
geographical or socio-economic differences, such as, for example, a North-South-East political 
divide. Another, alternative hypothesis anticipated that the representatives from the new member 
states would join the existing political structures, but that, with the growth in the number of 
MEPs competing for a relatively limited number of posts and roles in the political groups and 
parliamentary committees, internal competitive pressure would increase. In general, it was 
expected that the MEPs from CEE countries would behave somewhat differently from the 
MEPs from old member states (theoretical expectations voiced before enlargement are reflected 
in Hageman (2009, 10), Hix and Noury (2009, 160).  
This article aims to address the following puzzle: How could the European Parliament’s 
political groups maintain or even increase their voting cohesion after the influx of a significantly 
large number of new MEPs, moreover coming from countries with different historical 
experience, socio-economic characteristics, and political and party systems. In order to answer 
this question we will analyse how these new MEPs became integrated into the 6th European 
Parliament in terms of their representation in parliamentary leadership and parliamentary 
activities, and their voting behaviour.  
The article is organized in the following way. In the first section we discuss the existing 
literature and the first published empirical findings concerning the representation and integration 
of MEPs from the accession countries into the 6th EP. The second section introduces general 
theoretical assumptions, upon which we can evaluate these empirical findings. In the third section 
we present our hypothesis and methodology. The fourth section describes the three kinds of data 
we employ and presents the results of their analysis. The last section summarises our conclusions.  
 
1. Literature and empirical findings 
The question we are addressing in this article is not entirely new and has already appeared in 
several papers looking at the effects of enlargement on the European Parliament. However, the 
analysis provided here is more complex and employs new data analysis. Stefanie Bailer (2008) 
                                                 
4 In our analysis we include MEPs from the ten new member states from Central and Eastern Europe which joined 
the EU in May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), and January 
2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). We exclude Cyprus and Malta, which also joined in 2004, but do not belong to the 
same region and do not share the burden of a post-communist legacy or other political and cultural similarities with 
the other ten countries. 
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asks how it is possible that the EP’s political groups, which are internally ideologically quite 
diverse and, after enlargement, had to integrate MEPs from new member states, continue to 
show a relatively high level of cohesion, measured using roll-call vote data (Hix and A. Noury 
2009). As one possible explanation she suggests that roll-call votes do not reflect typical voting in 
the EP. They are used in only one quarter of all voting procedures and often in order to keep 
group members in line or to show a group’s position. As another explanation Bailer suggests that 
MEPs from new MSs “have impressively adapted to the parliamentary decision-making in the 
party groups” (Bailer 2008, 200). She finds it conceivable that the new deputies consciously 
choose a certain behaviour strategy following a “logic of appropriateness” in order to adapt well 
to the new environment.  
Towards the end of the 6th European Parliament (2004-2009) several empirically-based 
papers appeared comparing the trends from the 5th Parliament (1999-2004) with the post-
enlargement Parliament. Simon Hix and Abdul Noury (2009) analyzed all roll-call votes in the 
first part of the Sixth Parliament (July 2004 – December 2006) and compared aggregate- and 
individual-level MEP behaviour in these votes with MEPs’ behaviour in the Fifth Parliament 
(July 1999 – May 2004). They found a stable level of political group cohesion and inter-group 
coalitions that formed mainly around a left-right division. Even though Hix and Noury found a 
relative decrease in political group cohesion in the first half of the 6th EP, their overall conclusion 
was that enlargement did not change the way politics works inside the EP. In fact, data for the 
whole of the 6th parliamentary term show an increase in absolute group cohesion rates and thus 
confirm the long-term trend regardless of the influx of the new MEPs.  
These findings are  also confirmed by Sara Hagemann (2009) using the same data, 
additional material available at VoteWatch.EU, and also her own in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key figures in the European Parliament. Besides the fact that political group 
voting cohesion has slightly increased, the “Parliament has coped remarkably well in terms of 
‘efficiency in numbers’. The quantity of legislation passed by the Parliament has not decreased; 
nor have there been noticeable bottlenecks in policy ‘production’ which are directly attributable 
to the institution’s expansion” (Hagemann 2009, 24). Much of the credit for this is given to the 
centrally organized political groups, whose leadership provides voting instructions to individual 
MEPs.  
However, an emerging lack of genuine debate, especially in the plenary, was criticised as a 
drawback of this efficient, well-organized and bureaucratized legislative process in the EP. The 
principle that committee decisions should be representative of the views of the Parliament as a 
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whole is questioned by the fact that the brokering of agreements within a very short time frame 
are dominated by a few specific positions such as the political group Coordinators, Rapporteurs 
and committee Chairs. Concerns especially arise regarding the role of the group Coordinators, 
“[a]s [they] usually meet in advance and increasingly seek to broker agreements which are then 
presented to fellow group members and subsequently brought to the committee as a whole, 
informal structures increasingly seem to dominate the negotiating process between the political 
groups” (Hagemann 2009, 15). Moreover, MEPs from new member states were clearly under-
represented in these key positions and efforts were reportedly not made to allocate more such 
positions to the newcomers. Hagemann notes that this system, however effective in terms of 
legislative production, can only be considered also as democratically efficient if all MEPs have an 
equal opportunity to obtain key posts, and responsibilities are fairly distributed. 
 De Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczyński (2009) have also looked at the 6th EP from a 
comparative perspective. Their findings confirm that in the first half of the 6th EP term (2004-
2006) the MEPs from new member states were rather under-represented in key decision-making 
offices (such as the Bureau, the Conference of Presidents, and the Conference of Committee 
Chairmen) and posts. Moreover, De Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczyński found that the new member 
states’ MEPs did not sit on the committees which have major legislative output such as the 
Environmental and Transport Committee (measured as the amount of co-decision files). 
However, the authors conclude that in the second half of the 6th EP term, after the new MEPs 
“underwent a considerable learning process, integrating themselves more and more” (2009, 5), 
their representation in key offices and parliamentary jobs began to correspond to the share of 
their representation in the chamber. In this article we challenge this conclusion.  
Emanuel Emil Coman (2009) studied the roll-call votes in the first 16 months of the sixth 
EP (2004–05) and looked at the influence of political groups and national delegations on the 
voting behaviour of individual MEPs. One conclusion which is especially relevant for this article 
is that the new MEPs from CEE are more likely to side with their political group than with their 
national party group. Coman does not offer an explanation of this as it was outside the scope of 
his study, but it corresponds with our assumptions about the adaptation of the new MEPs and it 
corresponds with our findings.  
 Michael Kaeding and Steffen Hurka (2010, 2011) examined the allocation of reports in 
the 6th European Parliament using data on each individual MEP at VoteWatch.EU. They found 
that MEPs representing the new member states were significantly under-represented in the 
allocation process for committee reports under the most important procedures (co-decision, 
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budgetary and discharge). Representing over one quarter of the whole Parliament, these MEPs 
were responsible for only 16% of these reports. Moreover, the overall share of MEPs from new 
member states who were responsible for at least one report in the 2004-2009 parliamentary term 
was lower than the corresponding share among new MEPs from EU15. “Our data show that 
newcomers from ‘old’ Members States were clearly advantaged in the report allocation process 
when compared with their first-time peers from the accession countries” (2011, 15). According to 
Kaeding and Hurka, this significant under-representation of rapporteurs from accession countries 
“questions the integration efforts of the EP over the last five years” (2011, 15).5  
 
2. Hypotheses 
The eastern enlargement of the EU can be studied as the growth in size of a group. This 
approach is favoured by Stefanie Bailer, Robin Hertz and Dirk Leuffen (2008, 2009), who 
propose the use of three general theoretical assumptions in research into the effects of 
enlargement on EU institutions. These are oligarchization, formalization and adaptation. Bailer 
and her colleagues argue that since eastern enlargement represented a significant growth in size of 
a group, i.e. in the number of members of a group (in our case the EU, or more specifically the 
European Parliament), it is possible to apply these assumptions originally developed in sociology, 
even though, in the case of EU enlargement, we are dealing with collective actors rather than 
individual ones. These assumptions are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary, as they 
predict the effects of group size growth from different perspectives. Therefore effects predicted 
by all three theoretical assumptions can be found simultaneously.  
Oligarchization theory was originally introduced by Robert Michels (1999 [1915]) as the 
famous “Iron Law of Oligarchy” in the context of the organizational development of political 
parties. This theoretical assumption expects that in larger groups there is a tendency to establish 
informal decision-making structures from which only a few decision-makers at the top benefit. If 
applied to EU institutions, we can see member states or political parties interacting as collective 
actors in form of their representatives, e.g. in the Council or in the European Parliament. The 
oligarchization assumption expects that some countries or national party groups informally take 
decisions which are then followed by the rest. Furthermore, according to the oligarchization 
scenario we could assume that the entry of many new member states pressed the former EU 
members to defend their positions vis-à-vis the newcomers. This assumption consequently 
                                                 
5 The assumptions of significantly distinct political preferences of CEE MEPs is however questioned by Schmitt and 
Thomassen (2009). 
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predicts that as more members join an EU institution, in our case the European Parliament, the 
more former members will try to increase their power at the expense of the new-comers (Bailer, 
Hertz, and Leuffen 2008, 7–8).  
However, the actual formation of an ‘oligarchy’ in an organization is not an intended goal 
of the old members. It is rather a natural result of the technical and mechanical dynamics of big 
organizations. In order to maintain effective decision-making in an organization with many 
members, it is necessary to move the decision-making powers from open fora, such as an EP 
political group meeting, to more centralised bodies, such as the EP political group presidency 
(Bressanelli 2011, 6). In concrete terms, the prediction of the oligarchization scenario is that the 
MEPs from the old Member States would try to maintain their positions through the formal 
centralisation of decision-making structures, which they would try to keep under their control 
and from which they would try to exclude the new MEPs as much as possible. At the same time 
the old ‘oligarchy’ would maintain informal procedures in order to distribute important ‘jobs’ 
among themselves. Since the Iron Law of Oligarchy was originally formulated for political parties 
it is more natural to apply it to the party political groups in the European Parliament than to any 
other organs in the EU. 
On the basis of the assumption of oligarchization, we can formulate our first two 
hypotheses with regard to the tendencies in political groups of the European Parliament after 
eastern enlargement. 
H1: MEPs from the older member states will try to maintain their positions in the leadership of the European 
Parliament and political groups at the expense of the new MEPs, which will result in the under-representation of 
the new MEPs from CEE in these leadership positions. 
H2: MEPs from the old Member States will try to maintain their control over decisive parliamentary assignments 
at the expense of the new MEPs, who will in turn be under-represented in such assignments. 
The second theoretical assumption proposed by Bailer and her colleagues is formalization. 
This assumption draws on the sociological works of Georg Simmel, which predict that larger 
groups lead to more complex group dynamics. Growth in size makes it more difficult to provide 
collective goods optimally and therefore results in organizational changes. Such changes lead to 
the establishment of formal structures that can replace the personal and immediate cohesion and 
consensus-oriented decision-making typical for smaller groups. In the EU context, the 
formalization scenario predicts a growing tendency to use formal rules of decision-making 
(Bailer, Hertz, and Leuffen 2008, 5–6, 8) or the introduction of new formal rules of procedure 
which were not perceived necessary before enlargement.  
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Organizational change and substantial reform of the rules of procedure of the European 
Parliament’s major political groups in anticipation of eastern enlargement was well documented 
by Bressanelli (2011). The major political groups anticipating the 2004 enlargement made 
significant organizational changes in order to maintain their performance and efficiency vis-à-vis 
the perceived shock of enlargement. The main changes occurred in the mechanisms of intra-
group coordination and particularly in shifting power to more restricted bodies such as the 
groups’ bureaus and presidencies and strengthening procedures and bureaucracies (Bressanelli 
2011, 28–30). These reforms of the rules of procedure can be viewed as the formalization of de 
facto informal rules securing the positions of the MEPs of the old member states.  
Whereas oligarchization and formalization explain the tendencies of the longer-standing 
group members (in anticipation of the entrance of new members), adaptation, the third theoretical 
assumption proposed by Bailer and her colleagues, focuses on the newcomers. According to 
sociological institutionalism and organization theory, new members in a group are expected to 
adapt to existing norms (Bailer, Hertz, and Leuffen 2008, 8). In other words, they are supposed 
to adjust to a dominant “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). When applied to EU 
enlargement and specifically the European Parliament, we can say that the new MEPs joined 
already existing political groups and were uncertain how to behave in the new decision-making 
structures. Therefore, the new MEPs tended to copy the other MEPs’ behaviour. Consequently, 
despite the presence of structural differences and the potentially distinct preferences of the MEPs 
from new member states, the adaptation assumption predicts that they will actually follow the 
voting behaviour of their political groups. One possible reason for such behaviour is simply a 
lack of access to information which would allow the new MEPs to formulate their preferences 
more independently of the political groups. Following this assumption we can formulate our 
third hypotheses: 
H3: MEPs from the CEE will adapt their voting behaviour to the existing norms in the political groups and will 
thus vote at least as cohesively with their groups as their fellows from the older member states.  
Having formulated these three complementary hypotheses we can now introduce our 
methodological approach. We have identified key indicators of the integration of MEPs to the 
European Parliament, its political groups, and its work. The first hypothesis is concerned with the 
leadership of the European Parliament and the political groups. We assume that if representation 
of the MEPs from CEE in leadership positions corresponds to their overall share in the whole 
EP and the respective groups, we can conclude that they are well integrated in parliamentary 
leadership. Similarly, regarding the second hypothesis, we can assume that the CEE MEPs are 
Středoevropské politické studie  Ročník XIV, Číslo 1, s. 35-55 
Central European Political Studies Review  Volume XIV, Issue 1, pp. 35-55 
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Fakulty sociálních studií MU  ISSN 1212-7817 
 
 
 
43 
well integrated in key parliamentary work if they are well represented in the group of MEPs who 
are assigned with responsibility for committee reports and other important jobs. The third 
hypothesis concerns the voting behaviour of the MEPs. We can assume that the new MEPs are 
well integrated if they adopt similar voting patterns as their peers from older member states. 
Thus, we propose the following three indicators of the integration of new MEPs: integration into 
parliamentary leadership, integration into parliamentary work, and integration according to voting 
patterns. Each indicator is operationalized in a specific way and for each indicator we have 
collected different data. The following section describes the data we have employed and 
elaborates on the data analysis and its results.  
 
3. Data description and analysis 
The present section looks at the integration of MEPs from CEE countries into parliamentary 
leadership and parliamentary work, and with regard to voting patterns. The analysis focuses on 
the period covering the whole of the 6th European Parliament (July 2004 – July 2009) and the 
beginning of the 7th Parliament (July 2009 – July 2011). We focus on data concerning the three 
biggest EP political groups: the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP; in the 6th EP called 
the European People’s Party-European Democrats), the Socialist Group (PSE; in the 7th EP 
called the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), and the Group of the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). During the relevant period, these three 
groups together included around three quarters of all MEPs, as well as about three-quarters of all 
CEE MEPs.6 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of MEPs in the big three EP groups 
 All MEPs  CEE MEPs  
2004-06 75,95% (556/732) 72,84% (110/151) 
2007-09 77,07% (605/785) 77,94% (159/204) 
2009-11 72,41% (533/736) 76,31% (145/190) 
We could have included also other groups in our analysis, but there are three methodological 
reasons why we focused only on the three biggest. Firstly, the proportion of CEE MEPs in the 
three biggest groups was comparable to the proportion of all MEPs in those groups, whereas the 
                                                 
6 We looked only at the first part of the 7th Parliament from July 2009 to July 2011. During this period, the EP had in 
total 736 Members. It was only in December 2011 that 17 additional MEPs started their mandates (the Netherlands 
had still to appoint the 18th MEP), implementing a Protocol amending Protocol 36 of the Lisbon Treaty on 
transitional provisions (increasing the number of MEPs to 754 until the end of the 7th Parliament). 
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proportion of CEE MEPs in all the other groups was significantly different from that of all 
MEPs (most notably, in the 6th EP there were 5.4% of all MEPs in the Green group, but only 
0.5% MEPs from CEE countries). Secondly, two of the four smaller groups not only changed 
their names but also their national parties during the observed period (with the European 
Conservatives and Reformists Group created only in the 7th EP from national parties whose 
MEPs were in different groups in the 6th EP), which would make comparison throughout the 
whole observed period difficult. Finally, as mentioned above, the three biggest groups 
represented around three quarters of the MEPs from all member states as well as from CEE 
countries; therefore, the analysis of the integration of CEE MEPs based on data concerning these 
three groups can be considered representative. The level of integration of CEE MEPs in some of 
the smaller groups might have been different, but this would not change the overall picture.  
 
3.1. Integration into parliamentary leadership 
The first indication of the integration of MEPs from CEE in the European Parliament is their 
representation in leadership positions of the Parliament and political groups. As mentioned 
earlier, key decision-making positions such as membership in a group presidency, or key roles 
such as group coordinator became more important in the 6th EP both formally (due to reforms of 
the groups’ rules of procedure (Bressanelli 2011)) and informally (Hagemann 2009).  
 What do we mean by leadership positions? Parliamentary leadership together with 
political groups and committees constitute the three main organizational structures that facilitate 
control of the EP agenda. There are three major leadership bodies in the EP: the Bureau 
(consisting of the president and vice-presidents), the Conference of Presidents (consisting of the 
EP president and chairmen of the political groups) and the Conference of Committee Chairmen 
(e.g. Dinan 2005, 281; Hix 2005, 90). We can also add the Conference of Delegation Chairmen 
made up of the heads of EP delegations, which do not deal with the main EP legislative agenda 
but can still be considered as important and influential positions.  
The Bureau deals with various financial and administrative matters regarding 
organization, including drawing up the EP’s draft estimates and deciding on the composition and 
structure of the EP secretariat. The Conference of Presidents is the main political leadership 
body. It deals with matters other than routine, including deciding on seating arrangements; 
arranging the EP’s work programme, such as assigning the drafting of reports to committees and 
drawing up the draft agendas for plenary sessions; and authorising the drawing up of its own 
initiative reports. The Conference of Committee Chairmen undertakes such tasks as arranging for 
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necessary liaison between committees, settling inter-committee disputes, and generally 
monitoring the progress of business through the committee system. The Conference of 
Delegation Chairmen discusses common organizational and planning matters concerning the 
four types of EP delegations, i.e. inter-parliamentary committees, joint parliamentary committees, 
delegations to the ACP-EU, and Euro-Med joint parliamentary assemblies (Nugent 2006, 272–
274).  
As far as political influence on the legislative agenda is concerned, we consider the importance of 
the four considered bodies to be in the following order, from the most important to the least 
important: (1.) The Conference of Presidents, (2.) The Conference of Committee Chairs, (3.) The 
Bureau, and (4.) The Conference of Delegation Chairs. All of these bodies are elected for a two-
and-a-half-year term of office (as detailed in the Rules of Procedure (European Parliament 
2011)). In our analysis, we consider the two terms in the 6th EP, the first from July 2004 to 
December 2006 and the second from January 2007 to July 2009. It is necessary to treat the 6th 
Parliament as two distinct terms not only because parliamentary positions changed after the first 
half-term, but also because of the entrance of MEPs from Bulgaria and Rumania as of January 
2007, which changed the overall share of CEE MEPs. As a control, we also include the first term 
of the 7th Parliament elected in 2009. 
In addition, we consider leadership positions within the political groups, which are the central 
posts for structuring debate and coalition formation in the EP legislative process (Hix 2005; 
Kreppel 2002). Here, we look at the two biggest groups, which together make up almost two 
thirds of the whole EP. The leadership of the groups is represented by the group Presidency 
composed of the president and vice-presidents of the groups. Another important indicator of 
importance within a group is the post of group coordinator in an EP committee. Group 
coordinators are responsible for coordinating the work of their group members in the respective 
committees. Therefore, each major group nominates usually one coordinator for each committee. 
Together with the committee chair, the coordinators negotiate the distribution of rapporteurships 
between the groups. Once a group has been assigned a report, the coordinator allocates it to a 
member of his/her group (EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament 2007, 14, 29; Mamadouh 
and Raunio 2003, 340).  
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Figure 2: Proportion of MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe 
CEE 
MEPs EP whole EPP PSE ALDE 
2004-06 20,63% (151/732) 23,88% (64/268) 
14,00% 
(28/200) 20,45% (18/88) 
2007-09 25,99% (204/785) 29,90% (87/291) 
20,00% 
(43/215) 29,29% (29/99) 
2009-11 25,82% (190/736) 30,57% (81/265) 
24,46% 
(45/184) 22,62% (19/84) 
 
 
The following table shows the proportion of MEPs from the new CEE member states in the 
four most important leadership bodies. We can see that the CEE MEPs were under-represented 
in each of the bodies relative to their representation in the whole plenary in each of the observed 
terms of office (except for the lest relevant delegation chairs in 2004-06). What is, however, most 
striking is that their representation among all leadership posts combined did not increase from 
one term to the other, as expected or claimed by some of the studies cited above, but, on the 
contrary, slightly decreased. This trend continued also in the first term of 7th Parliament.  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of CEE MEPs in the Leadership Positions 
CEE 
MEPs 
Presidents Committee 
Chairs 
Bureau Delegations 
Chairs 
Sum 
2004-06 0,00% (0/10) 18,18% (4/22) 20,00% (3/15) 21,62% (8/37) 
17,86% 
(15/84) 
2007-09 0,00% (0/10) 17,39% (4/23) 13,33% (2/15) 21,62% (8/37) 
16,47% 
(14/85) 
2009-11 20,00% (2/10) 4,35% (1/23) 21,05% (4/19) 20,00% (8/40) 
16,30% 
(15/92) 
 
Despite the fact that in 2004 CEE MEPs constituted over one fifth of the whole EP, none of 
them was a member of the politically most important body – the Conference of Presidents – for 
the whole 6th Parliament. Only 4 out of 22 or 23 committee chairs came from CEE and their 
representation in the Bureau was no better. Contrary to the expectations of scholarly observers of 
the first half-term of the 6th Parliament, the proportion of CEE MEPs in leadership positions did 
not increase in the second half-term, but in fact decreased after the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007. The influence of CEE MEPs on the political and legislative management of the 
European Parliament was limited due to their under-representation in the EP leadership. 
Moreover, if we look at the level of representation of CEE MEPs in the first term of the 7th 
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Parliament, even though the EP President came from a CEE country, their representation 
especially among committee chairs was extremely poor (just 1 out of 23!).7  
It should be noted that all leadership posts are first allocated to political groups according to their 
size in the EP; only afterwards do the political groups choose individual MEPs to fill the 
allocated places. Meanwhile, the biggest groups have more places at their disposal. Therefore, it 
matters whether CEE MEPs join bigger or smaller groups. This fact, however, has no significant 
implications for our conclusions, because the proportion of all MEPs in the three biggest groups 
is comparable to the representation of CEE MEPs in these groups.  
For a more complex picture we add analysis of the representation of CEE MEPs in the 
Presidencies of the two biggest political groups, namely the European People’s Party (in 2004-
2009 the European People’s Party – European Democrats) and the Socialists and Democrats (in 
2004-2009 the Socialist Group / PSE)8. We look at the representation of CEE MEPs in the 
group Presidencies (President and Vice-Presidents of the groups) and among the groups’ 
committee coordinators. From the table below, we can see that CEE MEPs in the EPP-ED 
group were especially underrepresented in the first term. The fact that CEE MEPs did not have 
any committee coordinator in the first term can be understood as a logical consequence of the 
necessity for coordinators to have parliamentary experience and expertise. However, CEE MEPs 
continued to be underrepresented in the two following terms particularly among coordinators, 
which can hardly be explained by a lack of parliamentary experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 This quantitative approach provides highly relevant findings. However, we should not overlook the qualitative 
approach focusing on the different weights of the observed data. For example, CEE MEPs were underrepresented in 
the period 2007-2009 regarding committee chairs; however, they held two important ones – the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Environmental Committee (ENVI). Similarly, in the 2009-2011 period, the CEE 
MEPs were significantly underrepresented in quantitative terms; however, a CEE MEP held one of the most 
important positions - the EP Presidency (Jerzy Buzek). The measurement of the importance and influence of these 
particular positions would require much deeper qualitative inquiry.  
8 The ALDE group was not included because comparable data were not available to the author.  
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Figure 4: Proportion of CEE MEPs in Group Leadership 
 EPP-ED  Total Presidency  Coordinators 
CEE MEPs 23,88% 10,00% 0,00% 2004 - 2006 
Total MEPs 268 10 22 
CEE MEPs 28,82% 18,18% 4,35% 2007 - 2009 
Total MEPs 288 11 23 
CEE MEPs 30,57% 18,18% 25,00% 2009 - 2011 
Total MEPs 265 11 28 
     
 PSE   Total Presidency Coordinators 
CEE MEPs 14,00% 11,10% 3,70% 2004 - 2006 
Total MEPs 200 9 27 
CEE MEPs 14,00% 18,18% 3,70% 2007 - 2009 
Total MEPs 216 11 27 
CEE MEPs 24,46% 27,27% 4,35% 2009 - 2011 
Total MEPs 184 11 23 
 
 
The representation of CEE MEPs in the PSE group was higher than in the EPP group. 
However, regarding group coordinators, CEE MEPs were dramatically underrepresented. 
Despite minor deflections, generally the new MEPs from CEE seemed to be systematically 
under-represented in key bodies and positions relative to their number in the EP Plenary and in 
the two biggest political groups. This fact supports our first hypothesis that MEPs from the old 
member states maintain their dominance in leadership positions vis-à-vis the newcomers. 
All the data in this sub-section were collected from the websites and official publications 
and internal documents of the European Parliament and the two biggest groups (EPP-ED/EPP 
and PSE/S&D). 
 
3.2. Integration into parliamentary work 
The second hypothesis predicts that CEE MEPs will be under-represented in assignments of 
paramount parliamentary work such as drafting reports or tabling amendments. That this 
hypothesis actually holds for committee reports was confirmed by Kaeding and Hurka (2010, 
2011), who found that the chances of new member states MEPs becoming rapporteurs were 
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lower than those of their peers from the old member states and that this pattern holds even when 
comparing MEPs from the accession countries with first-time MEPs from the old member states. 
In our analysis we look not only at the reports, but also at amendments to reports and 
other parliamentary activities such as speeches in the plenary, motions for resolutions, written 
declarations, opinions, and parliamentary questions. The engagement of MEPs in these activities 
indicates the level of their participation in parliamentary work. Precise data for each MEP are 
available at the official website of the European Parliament under the profiles of individual MEPs 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu). All these data were collected by the website VoteWatch.eu and 
made available through different filters, which make comparison of the data more accessible. We 
employed the data for each MEP listed on the VoteWatch.eu website for the period of the 6th and 
7th EP till July 2011 and divided them according to the three sub-periods of 2004-2006, 2007-
2009 and 2009-20119. In the whole observed period all MEPs in total drafted 2 876 reports and 
2 057 opinions; they made 101 155 single speeches in the plenary, tabled 22 677 motions for 
resolutions, submitted 1 787 written declarations, tabled 39 348 amendments to reports, and put 
64 620 parliamentary questions to the Commission or Council. That makes in total 234 520 single 
parliamentary activities for the considered period from July 2004 to July 2011.  
To analyze the data systematically we ran 112 individual t-tests (unequal variance assumed), one 
for each combination of parliamentary activity, party group, and period. So for each 
parliamentary activity we assessed whether CEE MEPs were engaged in those activities less than 
MEPs from the old member states, considering separately the group of all MEPs (from all the 
political groups), the group of EPP MEPs, the group of PSE MEPs and the group of ALDE 
MEPs, in the three sub-periods (2004-2006, 2007-2009 and 2009-2011) as well as in the whole 
period (2004-2011). A summary of the results of all the t-tests is shown in the following table, 
where 1 means that CEE MEPs engaged in the respective activity statistically significantly less 
often than other MEPs, 0 means that there was no statistically significant difference between the 
activity of CEE and other MEPs, and 2 means that CEE MEPs were actually engaged 
significantly more often in the respective activity than other MEPs. For all the tests the level 
α<0.05 was used as the threshold.  
 
                                                 
9 It should be mentioned that the VoteWatch.eu website shows a certain amount of error. Most importantly it does 
not reflect changes in the status of the MEPs during the parliamentary term, including transfers from one political 
group to another. The list of MEPs also includes those who were members for only part of the term. This may cause 
some minor distortion of the results if we consider the activities of CEE MEPs of the three biggest groups. 
However, the results concerning all MEPs should not be affected by this imperfection in the source data.  
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Figure 5: Results for each activity 
period group 
amendmen
ts  
declaratio
ns  
motion
s  
opinion
s  
question
s  reports  
speeche
s 
EPP 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
PSE 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
ALDE 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1st 
period 
2004-06 
all 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
EPP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
PSE 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
ALDE 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
2nd 
period 
2007-09 
all 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
EPP 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 
PSE 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
ALDE 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3rd 
period 
2009-11 
all 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 
EPP 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
PSE 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 
ALDE 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
whole 
period 
2004-11 
all 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
Speaking in terms of statistically significant differences, in the first half term (2004-2006) CEE 
MEPs were less often engaged in all the activities except for submitting written declarations. In 
the second half term (2007-2009) they engaged less in drafting reports, tabling amendments to 
reports, and putting parliamentary questions. CEE MEPs remained under-represented in these 
three activities also in the first part of the new Parliament (2009-2011). However, in the case of 
tabling motions for resolutions CEE MEPs were more active than their colleagues from the old 
member states.  
The importance and relevance  of these different parliamentary activities to the actual legislative 
decision-making varies substantially. Each of them is precisely defined in the EP Rules of 
Procedure (European Parliament 2011). By far the most important are committee reports. 
However, the importance of even these reports varies greatly. Reports under co-decision, 
budgetary and discharge procedures can be considered as the most important. The EP’s own 
initiative reports might be politically relevant, but have less impact in the legislative process. In 
our dataset we do not distinguish between different types of reports. Drafting reports is an 
exclusive activity which is always assigned to particular MEPs. Each political group is, according 
to its size, allocated a certain number of reports which the group leadership (especially the 
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coordinator) distributes among the group members. The second most relevant kinds of reports 
to the actual legislative process in the Parliament are amendments to reports.  
The T-tests we performed clearly showed that MEPs from CEE were rapporteurs 
statistically significantly less often than MEPs from older member states. This confirms the 
findings of Kaeding and Hurka (2011). However, our findings also show that this trend did not 
significantly change in the 7th Parliament, where CEE MEPs were also less often reporters than 
their peers. Also, in the case of tabling amendments to reports and putting parliamentary 
questions, CEE MEPs were significantly under-represented in each of the observed terms and 
the whole plenary as well as in the three biggest political groups separately. Also, as regards these 
two activities, the trend of under-representation of CEE MEPs did not change in the first part of 
the new Parliament. This confirms the existence of systematic under-representation in key 
parliamentary work and thus confirms our hypothesis.  
On the other hand, we can see that in some activities CEE MEPs are represented equally in most 
cases, especially as regards submitting written declarations, drafting opinions and giving speeches 
in the plenary. In a few cases in the first part of the 7th Parliament CEE MEPs are even over-
represented as regards speeches of MEPs from the PSE group, motions for resolutions in the 
EPP group and written declarations in both the EPP and PSE groups. However, it is necessary to 
note that these parliamentary activities are not essential to the actual legislative process and thus 
cannot compensate for the lack of CEE MEP participation in key activities such as drafting 
reports and tabling amendments.  
We also found that MEPs from CEE were relatively less engaged in some of the parliamentary 
activities which are not restricted by the political group leadership and are based only on the 
individual MEPs’ initiative, e.g. parliamentary questions. From this fact we can assume either that 
CEE MEPs were relatively less active and showed less initiative in parliamentary work relative to 
their colleagues from older member states, or that they lacked access to information which would 
enable them to engage in these activities. All in all, we can assume that CEE MEPs were not only 
victims of tendencies towards oligarchization within the political groups which allocate 
parliamentary jobs, but also that CEE MEPs make their exclusion easier due to the lack of their 
own initiative and pro-activity.  
 
3.3. Integration into voting patterns 
In order to determine whether MEPs from the new member states were integrated into voting 
patterns in the European Parliament, we studied the voting records of all individual MEPs in the 
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6th EP and in the first two years of the 7th Parliament. The overall voting pattern was that MEPs 
increasingly voted along political group lines and decreasingly along the national delegation line 
(Hix, A. G. Noury, and Roland 2007). We used data from the VoteWatch.EU website 
(www.votewatch.eu/cx_meps_statistics.php) labelled “voting loyalty” of the individual MEPs 
expressed in percentages. “Loyalty” to a political group shows how often an MEP votes with the 
majority of MEPs from the same political group. In other words, this measure is the percentage 
of times an MEP votes with the majority (i.e. Max[Yes,No,Abstain]) of his/her political group in 
a given period. 
We processed the data using a statistical programme employing a two-sample T-test with 
unequal variance assumed. The T-test clearly showed that CEE MEPs in the three biggest groups 
(EPP, PSE and ALDE) voted more often with the majority of their groups than MEPs from 
older member states, and that this difference was statistically significantly. This means that MEPs 
from new member states strengthened rather than weakened the voting cohesion of the political 
groups. This was found by Coman (2009) using data for only the beginning of the 6th term, and 
we can confirm his findings on the basis of data for the whole period and the first part of the 7th 
term. 
Thus, we can conclude that new MEPs not only integrated into the voting patterns 
already existing in the EP, but actually followed the overall trend of voting behaviour more 
closely than the MEPs from older member states. In line with our hypothesis, they fully adapted 
to the existing norms in the new environment. However, this result actually shows that CEE 
MEPs used the possibility to vote differently from their political group, which could reflect 
specific interests they represent, less often than the rest of the MEPs. The question is why. The 
explanation is unlikely to be that they had less specific preferences (such as national, regional or 
other) than other MEPs. It is reasonable to assume that CEE MEPs relied on their political 
group voting instructions (the so called “voting lists”) more, because they had less information 
about potential alternatives. Therefore, this above-average voting conformity on the part of new 
MEPs indicates that they were less integrated into the political life of the Parliament. They were 
not able to formulate their own specific positions and thus depended more on official voting lists 
than their fellows from other member states. 
 
Conclusions  
In this article we addressed the puzzle of how EP political groups were able to maintain their 
voting cohesion after the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, which introduced a significant number 
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of new member states MEPs with potentially different preferences and modes of voting 
behaviour. We introduced three general theoretical assumptions of oligarchization, formalization 
and adaptation, which could provide an answer to this puzzle. On the basis of these theoretical 
assumptions, we formulated three hypotheses regarding the integration of CEE MEPs into 
parliamentary leadership, work and voting patterns. In order to test the hypotheses we relied on 
data on the composition of leadership positions in the European Parliament and the two biggest 
political groups. We also employed data from the VoteWatch.EU website regarding individual 
MEPs’ parliamentary work records and voting behaviour.  
 Our findings can be summarised in the following way. Regarding leadership positions, we 
found that MEPs from CEE countries were significantly underrepresented especially among the 
political group presidents and committee chairs, the two most important types of positions. 
Moreover, we found that this trend did not change in the first half term of the 7th EP, which 
indicates the rather systematic under-representation of CEE MEPs. These findings are 
completely in line with our hypothesis that the MEPs from older member states will try to 
maintain their positions in parliamentary leadership at the expanse of the newcomers. This 
oligarchical tendency should not be understood as a result of conscious intentions of the MEPs 
from older Member States. As the oligarchization assumptions states, it is rather a natural result 
of the technical and mechanical dynamics of big organizations. 
We also studied the integration of CEE MEPs into parliamentary work. Our findings 
confirmed prior evidence that MEPs from new member states were significantly under-
represented among the rapporteurs as well as in other key parliamentary activities such as tabling 
amendments to reports and putting parliamentary questions. Our findings, however, show that 
this trend of under-representation, which is present in both terms of the 6th EP, continues also in 
the 7th Parliament. Again, we can conclude that this demonstrates the systematic under-
representation of new MEPs, who are thus relatively excluded from the legislative work of the 
European Parliament.  
Finally, we examined the voting patterns adopted by new member states MEPs. 
Interestingly we found that new MEPs not only voted in line with their political groups, but also 
that they actually voted with their group majority more often than their fellows from older 
member states. There could be several explanations for this. Nevertheless, it certainly confirms 
our hypothesis that new MEPs will adapt to existing voting patterns rather than defect.  
All in all, our findings confirm our hypotheses, formulated on the bases of general 
theoretical assumptions of social science. We can conclude that, during the period under 
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investigation, MEPs from CEE member states integrated into key positions and activities in the 
European Parliament relatively poorly despite the fact that they followed the voting instructions 
of their political groups more often than longer-standing MEPs. The theoretical assumptions we 
made certainly do not provide sufficient explanation for this. Therefore, further and most 
probably qualitative research will be needed to explain precisely why new CEE MEPs integrated 
in this rather curious way to the EP. To solve the puzzle presented in this article, we can 
conclude that the political groups were able to maintain or even slightly increase their voting 
cohesion after eastern enlargement, because they managed to marginalize the influence of MEPs 
from the new CEE member states on the legislative process in the European Parliament. 
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